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Changes in Economic Status and Timing of Marriage of Young Canadians 
 
 
A. Theoretical Background 
 
A most-often cited theory to explain the effects of economic factors on marriage is  
Becker’s hypothesis, the essence of which is captured by this statement from his Treatise 
on the Family: ‘the gain from marriage is reduced by a rise in the earnings and labour 
force participation of women and by a fall in fertility because a sexual division of labour 
becomes less advantageous’ (Becker 1981: 248).  This is often referred to as economic 
independence hypothesis and implies that labour force participation and the education 
that facilitates such involvement have negative impact on marriage for women while, 
presumably, the economic conditions’ positive impact continues to hold for men. This is 
also referred to as specialization and trading model because it assumes that marriage is 
an exchange transaction based on an implicit gender division of tasks (Oppenheimer, 
1997; Sweeney, 2002).  
 
The economic independence hypothesis has been challenged, particularly by 
Oppenheimer (1997, 2000) who points out that the empirical individual-level studies do 
not provide evidence to support the hypothesis. As an alternative to the simple connection 
between economic independence and marriage, she proposes a more nuanced relationship 
that takes into account the time spent for schooling and the marriage market. 
Oppenheimer and Lew (1995:116), for example, propose that “the increasingly achieved 
nature of women’s socio-economic characteristics introduces some of the same delaying 
factors into marriage formation that has traditionally existed for men”. For both men and 
women, the relation between marriage timing and labour force involvement is mediated 
by the time needed to achieve socio-economic characteristics. This means that the effect 
of education, or specifically, the duration spent in obtaining it, delays entry into marriage 
for men and women, a career entry hypothesis. Furthermore, in contrast to Becker’s 
hypothesis, they contend that labour force participation and earnings of women could 
have a positive impact on the timing of marriage. Women’s labour force participation, in 
particular, regular full-time job and long-term employment “provide greater access to 
more attractive marriage markets, increase a young woman’s desirability as a potential 
mate, or facilitate an earlier marriage than would be possible if it were based on the 
young man’s earning alone” (p. 118).  
 
The contrast between Becker’s and Oppenheimer’s hypotheses stems from the 
assumption about the prevailing types of marriage (or family). Becker’s is essentially 
about a complementary or traditional, breadwinner type of family. In contrast, as gleaned 
from Oppenheimer’s (1997, 2000) discussion of the disadvantages of gender-based 
specialization, her proposition assumes that the prevailing, or at the least, the type of 
marriage aimed at is a symmetrical model, an emerging type of family where couples 
profit from economic inter-dependence and husbands engage in housework though not 
necessarily equal to the wives’ unpaid domestic work (Bachrach, Hindin, and Thomson, 
2000; Cherlin, 2000).  
 
That family types make a difference is evident from a number of empirical studies that 
examined the relationship between marriage and labour force participation, earnings, and 
education. For instance, Blossfeld and his colleagues (1995) hypothesize that the effect of 
women’s level of education on entry into marriage and motherhood depends on the 
family system prevailing in the country – the more conventional or traditional the family 
system, the stronger the delaying effect of women’s education. Their empirical analyses 
show that while a longer stay in the educational system does delay entry into marriage 
(referred to as the institutional effect of education, similar to Oppenheimer’s career entry 
hypothesis), the level of education itself has positive effect in the United States and 
insignificant or no effect in countries such as Sweden, West Germany, and Hungary (the 
human capital investment effect) (Blossfeld, 1995). Of the nine countries examined by 
Blossfeld and colleagues, Becker’s economic independence hypothesis that implies a 
negative impact of the level of education on marriage entry is supported only in Italy 
where the family system is most conventional.  Similarly, Tsuya and Mason (1995) show 
that in Japan, where family types have remained complementary, women with high 
education and in professional occupations have lower probabilities of marrying.  
 
 
A corresponding shift in the effect of women’s economic status is also evident when 
studies are made over cohorts. For West Germany, Huinink and Mayer (1995) find that 
among the 1929 birth cohorts, employed women had lower probabilities of transition to 
marriage but the probabilities gradually increased over cohorts such that for the 1951-
1961 cohorts, the probabilities had become higher for the employed than for the 
unemployed. For Canada, using data from the 1995 General Social Survey, Turcotte and 
Goldscheider (1998) find that, in contrast to women born before 1950, younger women 
with higher education are more likely to marry. Similarly, Mongeau, Neill, and Le 
Bourdais (2001) show that work interruptions made marriage more likely among older 
cohorts of women but among more recent cohorts, uncertainties at work made 
cohabitation more likely than marriage.  
 
 
B. Hypotheses 
 
In this paper, using prospective longitudinal data, we examine the effect of education, 
labour force participation, and earnings on the timing of marriage. As the study focuses 
on young Canadians, our hypotheses would be in line with Oppenheimer’s, specifically,  
 
• education of both men and women would delay marriage, and 
• labour force participation and earnings of women, like those of men, would 
increase the likelihood of marriage.  
 
Furthermore, taking a life course perspective, we hypothesize that the magnitude of 
effects would vary as follows:  
 
o At young ages, it is the career entry hypothesis that would apply; that is, whether 
or not men or women go for higher education would be the main economic 
determinant of their probabilities of marrying. The effect of income and labour 
force participation would be small as most of them would not have as yet 
established themselves in the labour market.  
o At ages when men and women would have completed post-secondary education, 
labour force participation and earnings would have a greater impact as these 
would be major considerations in the active search for partners in the marriage 
market. 
o As men and women grow older, the effects of these economic-related variables 
would diminish because many of those motivated mainly by economic factors 
would have, most likely, already married. For those still unmarried, other reasons 
for marrying, such as preferences between work and family life, would become 
more relevant.    
 
 
C. Data and Methods 
 
The Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, conducted by Statistics Canada, is a 
longitudinal household survey whose target population is all persons living in Canada 
excluding residents of Yukon and Northwest Territories, residents of institutions, persons 
living on Reserves, and full-time members of the Canadian Armed Forces living in 
barracks (Statistics Canada, 1997). The survey gathers information on people’s economic 
well-being including labour force participation and income, and on other topics such as 
family-related events (for example, marriage). It collects information for a panel over a 
period of six years, with a new panel selected every three years.  In this study, we use 
Panel 1, the respondents of which were interviewed twice a year from 1994 to 1999 for 
information pertaining to the period from 1993 until 1998, with data about the 
respondents in 1992 as baseline information.   
 
While longitudinal surveys have advantages over cross-sectional surveys, they do have 
their limitations. Attrition is more severe among the subjects of this study -- young never 
married men and women are very mobile. Another problem is right-censoring, that is, 
information gathering is curtailed by the survey dates although estimation through 
survival analysis, the method used in this study, generally corrects for right censoring. 
And, left censoring is also a concern, that is, we do not have information on events that 
happened to the respondents before the survey.  
 
To deal with left-censoring, we use an analytical strategy roughly patterned after 
Oppenheimer and Lew (1995) that helps us understand the process under study (here, 
timing of entry in marriage) in spite of censoring. We do our analysis by 3-year age 
groups, which allow us to bring a life course perspective. Thus, we could think of the 
ages 17- 19 for men and 15-17 for women as the starting point of the marriage process 
(as only about 1% has already married in 1992, see Table 1). Those among them who 
would marry in the next six years are the relatively “early marriers”. They could be taken 
as representatives of those whom we missed (or were left-censored) in the two older age 
groups in our analysis. The men aged 20-22 in 1992 and women aged 18-20 would be 
marrying in the next 6 years at just about the “right” age, whereas the oldest age groups, 
23-25 for men and 21-23 for women, would be the “late marriers”.  
 
Men 17-19 20-22 23-25 Total
% 98.7 89.2 64.5 84.2
N 829 753 802 2384
Women 15-17 18-20 21-23 Total
% 99.2 89.1 61.9 83.5
N 834 745 804 2383
Source: SLID Panel 1
Age Group in 1992
Table 1: Percentage Never Married in 1992 
by Sex and Age-Group
 
 
 
By the end of 1992, that is, before the information on events that happened in 1993 were 
collected through the survey, an equal proportion (16%) of men aged 17-25 and women 
aged 15-23 have already been married. As we do not have information on our variables of 
interests for them, we use the data only for the never married young men and women.  
Because we confine our study to those who were surveyed in all of the 6 waves, our 
analysis is based on 1262 men and 1335 women, about 23% of whom married between 
1993 and 1998 (Table 2). 
 
Men 17-19 20-22 23-25 Total
% 10.6 26.0 39.2 23.0
Weighted N 527 411 324 1262
Women 15-17 18-20 21-23 Total
% 8.1 26.2 36.4 22.9
Weighted N 469 462 404 1335
Source: SLID Panel 1
Age Group in 1992
Table 2: Percentage Married by 1998
 Among the Never Married in 1992
 By Sex and Age Group
 
 
 
To test the hypotheses outlined above we did Proportional Hazards Modeling for each of 
the 3-year age groups, using STATA, with age at marriage as our dependent variable. 
Models were done separately for men and women.  
 
As independent variables, we use Father’s education to capture the parental human, 
social, and financial investment on the respondent’s education, and also included the 
more commonly used variable, Respondent’s education. This would test the career entry 
hypothesis; that is, the higher the father’s education, the more likely the respondent 
would be in school longer (and consequently, have higher education), and thus, would be 
at lower risk of marrying at an early age.  
 
For indicators of economic inter-dependence, we use Wages and Salaries, and Labour 
Force Status. As predicted by the hypothesis, for both men and women, these two 
variables would be positively related to marriage – that is, the higher the salaries, the 
higher the risk of marriage (and thus, the younger the age at marriage); and, in contrast to 
the unemployed, those employed would have higher marriage risk.  
 
In the final model, we included Region, as we know that regional differences exist in 
family formation, with for example, Quebec having higher rates of cohabitation, deemed 
to delay marriage, compared to the other regions. We considered using Migration status 
and Ethnicity but there were very few cases of young migrants and visible minority in the 
sample.  
 
In the modeling, Father’s education is considered a time-invariant variable, while all the 
other variables are time-varying. The modeling also makes use of longitudinal weights to 
take into account the complexity of sampling procedure and correct for attrition over the 
six year period.  
 
 
D. Results of Analysis 
 
1. Results of models with only two variables: 
 
Table 3A and 3B show models using only two variables at a time; that is, Father’s 
education, a time invariant variable, paired with each of the other economic-related 
variables, all of which are time-varying. As can be seen in Model 1 of Table 3A, men 
whose fathers had post-secondary education have 67% lower risk of marrying compared 
to men whose fathers had elementary education. This difference is significant only for the 
youngest age group. For women, Model 1 of Table 3B shows that the trend is similar but 
the ratios do not show up as significant possibly because these two variables (Father’s 
and Respondent’s Education) are capturing the same effects. This is seen in Model 2 
wherein the effect of Father’s education (entered in the model without the Respondent’s 
education) is highly significant for women but only for the youngest age group, which 
supports the career entry hypothesis.  
 
In Model 2, as expected, Wages and salaries have positive effects for men in the two 
older age groups.  For those aged 20-22 in 1992, the risk of marriage increases by 0.14% 
for every $1000 increase in wages and salaries. The effect for the 23-25 is positive as 
well though somewhat smaller. More importantly, the effect of Wages and salaries for 
women is also positive, as predicted by the economic inter-dependence hypothesis 
(Model 2, Table 3B). And, following our additional hypothesis, this positive effect is not 
significant for women aged 21-23.  
 
Model 3 shows that those who are not employed are less likely to be married in all age 
groups of men and for the two older age groups of women.  
 
Hazard p> IzI Hazard p> IzI Hazard p> IzI
Model 1
Father's Education
Elementary ®
Some HS & HS Graduate 0.58 0.27 1.09 0.85 1.03 0.93
Post-Secondary 0.33 0.05 1.35 0.47 0.96 0.93
Respondent's Education
Less than High School Grad ®
Graduated High School 0.97 0.18 1.01 0.66 1.03 0.14
Non-University Post Sec. 0.98 0.35 1.01 0.53 1.02 0.23
University Degree 1.00 0.97 1.01 0.54 1.02 0.29
Model 2
Father's Education
Elementary ®
Some HS & HS Graduate 0.53 0.23 0.99 0.98 1.07 0.85
Post-Secondary 0.32 0.03 1.22 0.63 0.84 0.69
Wages and Salaries ($1000) 1.0010 0.06 1.0014 0.00 1.0005 0.04
Model 3
Father's Education
Elementary ®
Some HS & HS Graduate 0.50 0.21 0.98 0.96 1.06 0.85
Post-Secondary 0.29 0.02 1.28 0.57 0.76 0.51
Labour Force Status
Employed All Year ®
Employed Part-Year 1.00 0.86 0.98 0.21 1.00 0.82
Not Employed 0.93 0.05 0.94 0.03 0.94 0.01
Source: SLID Panel 1
Table 3A: Models of Relative Risks of Marriage (Hazard ratios and p  values)
 By Age Groups, Men
17-19 20-22 23-25
Males
Age Group in 1992
 
 
 
Hazard p> IzI Hazard p> IzI Hazard p> IzI
Ratio Ratio Ratio
Model 1
Father's Education
Elementary ®
Some HS & HS Graduate 0.45 0.07 1.49 0.25 1.13 0.74
Post-Secondary 0.43 0.13 0.99 0.98 1.81 0.13
Respondent's Education
Less than High School Grad ®
Graduated High School 0.96 0.08 0.98 0.28 1.03 0.35
Non-University Post Sec. 0.95 0.06 0.98 0.28 1.03 0.23
University Degree 0.93 0.15 1.00 0.98 1.01 0.62
Model 2
Father's Education
Elementary ®
Some HS & HS Graduate 0.33 0.02 1.67 0.19 1.02 0.96
Post-Secondary 0.29 0.03 1.15 0.73 1.58 0.22
Wages and Salaries ($1000) 1.0002 0.86 1.0011 0.03 1.0002 0.62
Model 3
Father's Education
Elementary ®
Some HS & HS Graduate 0.30 0.01 1.43 0.33 0.90 0.78
Post-Secondary 0.27 0.02 1.00 0.99 1.41 0.36
Labour Force Status
Employed All Year ®
Employed Part-Year 1.02 0.29 0.99 0.17 1.00 0.80
Not Employed 0.96 0.15 0.96 0.05 0.96 0.05
Source: SLID Panel 1
Table 3B: Models of Relative Risks of Marriage (Hazard ratios and p  values)
by Age Groups, Women
15-17 18-20 21-23
Age Group in 1992
 
 
 
2. Results of the full models 
 
As can be seen in Table 4A that shows the full model for men, the effect of Father’s 
education is highly significant only for the youngest age group. Respondent’s education 
shows somewhat similar effect. 
  
Labour force status no longer shows significant effects in the presence of Wages and 
Salaries, which is a more refined measure than mere employment. The impact of wages 
and salaries is significant in the two older age groups, with slightly weaker effect in the 
oldest age-group.   
 
As mentioned earlier, the lower risk at marriage in Quebec is obvious -- young people are 
opting more for cohabitation than marriage. As for the other regional differences, we 
need to find out why Ontario exhibits significantly higher risks of early marriage and 
British Columbia significantly lower risks of marriage at older ages.  
 
Hazard p> IzI Hazard p> IzI Hazard p> IzI
Ratio Ratio Ratio
Father's Education
Elementary ®
Some HS & HS Graduate 0.57 0.25 0.88 0.77 1.09 0.80
Post-Secondary 0.36 0.04 1.08 0.86 0.68 0.39
Respondent's Education
Less than High School Grad ®
Graduated High School 0.96 0.03 1.00 1.00 1.02 0.31
Non-University Post Sec. 0.98 0.30 1.01 0.82 1.01 0.68
University Degree 0.98 0.70 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.83
Wages and Salaries ($1000) 1.0009 0.10 1.0013 0.00 1.0007 0.04
Labour Force Status
Employed All Year ®
Employed Part-Year 1.02 0.37 1.00 0.96 1.02 0.17
Not Employed 0.95 0.19 0.98 0.52 0.97 0.24
Region
Atlantic ®
Quebec 0.96 0.15 0.95 0.03 0.95 0.01
Ontario 1.05 0.03 0.98 0.25 1.00 0.81
Prairie 1.02 0.28 0.98 0.19 0.99 0.55
British Columbia 1.03 0.40 1.00 0.96 0.94 0.02
Source: SLID Panel 1
Table 4A: Full Model of Relative Risks of Marriage (Hazard ratios and p  values)
by  Age Groups, Men 
17-19 20-22 23-25
Age Group in 1992
 
 
 
The results of the full model for women (Table 4B) also validate both the main 
hypotheses of career entry and economic inter-dependence; that is, a longer stay in school 
(indicated by Father’s and Respondent’s education) lowers the risk of marrying while 
indicators of economic well-being increase the risk.  
 
Our additional hypothesis that the effects of these economic considerations would 
become weaker among the older age group is validated as well. The effect of Labour 
Force status that shows up as significant when considered on its own (as shown earlier 
without the wages and salaries) no longer has significant effect in this full model.   
 
 
Hazard p> IzI Hazard p> IzI Hazard p> IzI
Ratio Ratio Ratio
Father's Education
Elementary ®
Some HS & HS Graduate 0.36 0.03 1.23 0.56 0.86 0.66
Post-Secondary 0.35 0.06 0.88 0.76 1.25 0.56
Respondent's Education
Less than High School Grad ®
Graduated High School 0.95 0.04 0.97 0.06 1.01 0.62
Non-University Post Sec. 0.95 0.09 0.97 0.08 1.02 0.38
University Degree 0.91 0.09 0.99 0.46 1.01 0.78
Wages and Salaries ($1000) 0.9998 0.91 1.0012 0.01 0.9998 0.67
Labour Force Status
Employed All Year ®
Employed Part-Year 1.01 0.54 1.00 0.70 1.00 0.86
Not Employed 0.95 0.11 0.97 0.14 0.97 0.13
Region
Atlantic ®
Quebec 0.96 0.15 0.95 0.00 0.96 0.08
Ontario 1.03 0.16 0.99 0.61 1.00 0.95
Prairie 1.03 0.17 0.99 0.33 1.01 0.41
British Columbia 1.02 0.49 0.97 0.11 1.02 0.25
Source: SLID Panel 1
Table 4B: Full Model of Relative Risks of Marriage (Hazard ratios and p  values)
by  Age Groups, Women 
15-17 18-20 21-23
Age Group in 1992
 
 
 
 
E. Discussion 
 
1. Postponement of Marriage 
 
This study provides insights on possible explanations for the continuing trend of 
postponement of marriage among young Canadians. The level of education is a main 
factor simply because going for higher levels of education takes more time. Viewed in 
terms of transition to adulthood or in terms of career entry, to take one’s place in the 
adult world of work, both men and women must have training and skills that now take a 
longer duration to complete, which in turn delays family formation. As Beaujot and Kerr 
(2004: 249) note, half of Canadians aged 25-34 have obtained post-secondary 
qualification, whereas the average for European countries is about 25%.  Going for 
higher education is most likely facilitated by parental resources but for many, acquiring 
higher education requires student loans, the period to repay which could also be a 
contributing factor in the postponement of marriage.  
 
The greater difficulty in entering the work force is another factor that contributes to the 
postponement of marriage. In recent years, unemployment rates among the young have 
been higher than among the older age groups, and many of the jobs available to them do 
not offer long-term security. What this study points to is that the delaying effect of 
unemployment not only holds for men, as was the case when families were mainly the 
traditional bread-winner type, but also for women as expectations about families shift 
from the traditional bread-winner to one of economic inter-dependence, with wives 
expected to contribute to the economic well-being of the family.   
 
While this study focused mainly on the economic-related factors, the results hint at other 
influences at work. Among those marrying at older ages, for example, our analysis shows 
that economic factors have weaker effects. Possibly at older ages, values become more 
salient. For example, using Hakim’s (2003) categorization of women into home-centered, 
adaptive, or work-centered on basis of their preferences, we could infer that those who 
have remained unmarried at even older ages are the work-centered women who would 
have put larger investment for education and training that delayed marriage even more. 
Further, their preference for careers might be such that they may not be motivated enough 
to marry even though their level of economic well-being would have been high enough to 
“afford” marriage.  Another values-related factor pertains to cohabitation. Many of those 
who have remained unmarried may in fact be in cohabiting unions. While many 
common-law unions do break up or end in marriage, many unions continue for long 
duration and are akin to marriage except for the absence of marriage certificate. 
Presumably, some couples prefer to live in such unions placing less importance to 
marriage, but others may face constraints such as not being able to reach a stage of 
economic security that would allow marriage.   
 
 
2. Polarization of the Life Course  
 
While marriage is postponed by many young adults for reasons of longer period of 
schooling, roughly about 10% do get married at a young age. As shown by the results, 
those whose fathers have lower education are more likely to marry young. This points to 
what keen social observers see as polarization of family life course, which starts early in 
life and with consequences for the succeeding generation (Bianchi, 2000; Martin, 2000; 
McLanahan, 2004; Lochhead , 2000; Schulze, H. J. and H. Tyrell,  2002). On one side are 
those who marry at a young age and would not have acquired the training and skills 
required to establish themselves in the labour market. They would thus, most likely, lead 
a life course trajectory that differs from those who have gone on for higher education. 
Such a trajectory would be characterized by early child-bearing and greater likelihood of 
experiencing family dissolution and lone parenthood, which in turn have adverse 
consequences for their children. On the other side are men and women who complete 
their education, form their family at older age, with the families thus formed likely to 
consist of dual-earners. This is evidenced by our results showing a positive effect of 
labour force participation and income for both men and women, the economic inter-
dependence hypothesis; pointing to an assortative mating process that pairs men and 
women with potentials for high earnings. Their later age at marriage, higher education 
and relatively more stable economic situation could provide protective factors against 
risks of family dissolution. They would thus be in good position to raise children with 
adequate human, social, and financial resources.    
 
 
3. Family Types of Young Couples 
 
The results of the analysis that conform to Oppenheimer’s career and economic inter-
dependence hypothesis, rather than Becker’s economic independence hypothesis, is an 
indication that young Canadians are moving away from the traditional, complementary 
family type. This does not mean however that the marriage of young couples is 
“symmetrical” or “shared” defined, for example, by Beaujot and Liu (2005) as husbands 
and wives doing 45-55% of paid and unpaid work. Families with both husband and wife 
doing paid work (the dual earners) are becoming more common, but, the sharing of paid 
and unpaid work even among young couples still shows that the complementary type 
persists, albeit  “weakened” by greater participation of women in paid work and of men 
in unpaid domestic work. Using data from the 1998 General Social Survey on Time Use, 
for example, Ravanera, Rajulton, and Turcotte (2003), find that young women spend 
more time doing unpaid work, particularly, when they form their family. However, to 
influence the timing of marriage, it is probably sufficient that the expectations of would-
be couples tend to be towards the symmetrical type. That is, compared to older cohorts, 
wives among younger cohorts are expected to contribute to the economic well-being of 
the family, and husbands are expected to do more of domestic and caring activities; 
which expectations in turn influence the timing of entry into marriage.  
 
 
4. Implications for Program Interventions and Future Research 
 
Given that economic factors do affect the timing of marriage and that their effects vary 
by age groups, what possible program interventions might help? To target those who 
would otherwise marry at young ages, programs that would lessen the effect of disparities 
in parental resources most especially through better funding for education - not only at 
the post-secondary but at lower levels as well - might be effective in reducing the effects 
of polarization. At about the “right age” of marrying, opportunities for employment of 
both young men and women providing secure sources of income might make for easier 
transition to marriage and parenthood. And, for everyone, but especially for those who 
are inclined to delay marriage at later ages (or possibly, forego marriage altogether), what 
may be needed is to change the perception that family and work are incompatible. In 
other words, interventions that facilitate the balancing of family and work life such as 
those related to family benefits and the provision of child-care services should be set in 
place. 
 
Finally, a related subject of interest is cohabitation. To fully understand marriage, we 
need to examine cohabitation and its impact on the timing of marriage. The trend in 
cohabitation has been increasing over cohorts such that among women born in 1976-80, 
for example, about 78% of them have already cohabited by 2001 (Ravanera, Rajulton, 
and Burch, 2005).  Wu (1999) suggests that common-law union delays marriage through 
longer period of pre-marital relationship and less active search for marital partner during 
the period of cohabitation. Although cohabitation could be seen as the start of forming a 
family particularly for unions that lead to marriage or to child-bearing, it still differs from 
marriage in many ways (Ambert, 2005), and thus, the influence of economic factors 
would differ as well. Cherlin (2000: 135) suggests, for example that in the United States, 
while it is desirable for women to have earnings, it is still culturally required that men 
have steady earnings to marry, which requirement presumably does not hold for 
cohabitation. Thus, we need to examine the influence of economic factors on 
cohabitation. As cohabitation most often leads to marriage, we need to examine in turn 
how this relation between cohabitation and economic factors influences marriage. For 
this analysis, we will need to expand the economic inter-dependence framework for 
marriage, taking cohabitation as an intermediate stage. We might also need to use other 
data set, or alternatively, use another technique of analysis as the Survey of Labour and 
Income Dynamics did not collect data on the age at start of cohabitation though it did 
gather information as to the marital or union status as of a given year.  
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